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  n September 22, 2014, a U.S.-led coalition began airstrikes against the 
so-called Islamic State in Syria. At the same time, the United States started 
targeting the Khorasan group in Syria. These two operations raise (again) 
the question of when States may use defensive force against non-State ac-
tors in other States.
1
 The text of the United Nations Charter does not re-
solve the question. Article 2(4) prohibits States from using force “against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”
2
 Article 51 
then recognizes “the inherent right to individual or collective self-defense if 
an armed attack occurs.”
3
 The proper interpretation of those provisions for 
cases involving non-State actors is uncertain and contested.  
The response in the secondary literature has been to try to resolve the 
uncertainty—to identify the interpretation that is or should be correct.
4 
For 
example, two prominent expert reports on the topic, the Chatham House 
Principles of International Law on the Use of Force in Self-Defence and the Leiden 
Policy Recommendations on Counter-Terrorism and International Law, recognize 
                                                                                                                      
1. Some readers might ask whether these operations should instead be characterized 
as humanitarian interventions. The operations arguably have a humanitarian angle, but 
none of the participating States has chosen to advance that angle as a justification for the 
use of force. See infra Part II. Further, the focus of the operations has been to repel the 
Islamic State and Khorasan group, not to alleviate the broader humanitarian crisis in Syria. 
See Louise Arimatsu & Michael N. Schmitt, Attacking “Islamic State” and the Khorasan Group: 
Surveying the International Law Landscape, 53 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 
BULLETIN 1, 24–27 (2014).  
2. UN Charter art. 2(4). 
3. Id., art. 51. 
4. For efforts to clarify the law as it applies to the Syria operations, see, e.g., Louise 
Arimatsu & Michael N. Schmitt, supra note 1, at 6; Ranj Alaaldin & Bilal Khan, Airstrikes 
on ISIS Targets in Syria and Iraq are Legal under International Law, LSE BLOG (Oct. 1, 2014),  
http://bit.ly/10kgN5t; Jennifer Daskal, Ashley Deeks & Ryan Goodman, Strikes in Syria: 
The International Law Framework, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 24, 2014), http://justsecurity 
.org/15479/strikes-syria-international-law-framework-daskal-deeks-goodman/; Mary El-
len O’Connell, Obama’s Illegal War: The Islamic State Never Attacked Us, So Why Are We At-
tacking Them?, POLITICO (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/st 
ory/2014/09/obamas-illegal-war-110863.html#VIBEkIe5ZkV; Marc Weller, Islamic State 













that the law in this area is uncertain and controversial.
5 
Each report then 
aims to clarify the law’s substantive content.
6 
Similarly, Sir Daniel Bethle-
hem’s recent piece in the American Journal of International Law argues that 
much of the scholarly literature on the topic is far removed from the op-
erational practice.
7 
Bethlehem offers a set of principles that he hopes will 
“attract a measure of agreement about the contours of the law.”
8 
His prin-




Efforts to clarify the law on the use of defensive force against non-
State actors are premature. The evident ambiguities and inconsistences in 
the practice reflect an ongoing struggle over the law’s proper content. This 
struggle cannot neatly be resolved because the international legal system is, 
at bottom, decentralized. No actor is charged with settling competing 
claims on the law or dismissing invalid claims. Unless and until States gravi-
tate toward the same claim, multiple claims will continue to circulate simul-
taneously. Any one of these claims might be treated as law by only some 
actors and not others, or in only certain respects and not others. Trying to 
clarify the law in the face of this contestation thus elides more than it re-
veals. It suppresses the underlying tensions that shape how global actors 
engage with the law in concrete cases.  
This article takes a different approach. Rather than try to distill the best 
or most accurate interpretation of the law, I map the positions that were 
plausibly available when the Syria operations began. I do so precisely be-
cause the law in this area has been unsettled. A broad range of legal posi-
tions might reasonably be invoked or applied in any given case. After map-
ping the legal terrain, I argue that the current operations in Syria accentuate 
                                                                                                                      
5. Elizabeth Wilmshurst, The Chatham House Principles of International Law on the Use of 
Force in Self-Defence, 55 INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 963, 964 
(2006) [hereinafter Chatham House Principles]; NICO SCHRIJVER & LARISSA VAN DEN HERIK, 
LEIDEN POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ON COUNTER-TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, ¶ 29 (2010) [hereinafter LEIDEN POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS], available at http:// 
www.grotiuscentre.org/resources/1/Leiden%20Policy%20Recommendations%201%20A
pril%202010.pdf. 
6. Chatham House Principles, supra note 5, at 963; LEIDEN POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, 
supra note 5, ¶ 29. 
7. Daniel Bethlehem, Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate 
Actors, 106 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 770, 773 (2012). 
8. Id. 
9. Notes and Comments, Self-Defense Against Nonstate Actors (Continuation of the Debate), 
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three preexisting trends. First, the claim that international law absolutely 
prohibits the use of defensive force against non-State actors is losing legal 
traction. That claim is increasingly difficult to sustain. Second, States have 
not coalesced around a legal standard on when such force is lawful. Most 
States seem conflicted or uncertain on that question, and have declined to 
advance a particular legal position. Third, this ambivalence has contributed 
to a sizeable gap between the norms that are widely articulated as law and 
the ones that reflect the operational practice. States regularly tolerate opera-
tions that they are not yet willing to legitimize with legal language.  
 
II. MAPPING THE LEGAL TERRAIN 
 
When the Syria operations began, several positions on the use of defensive 
force against non-State actors were in play. Each of these positions had 
some support in the practice and secondary literature. But none was widely 
accepted as the correct interpretation of the law. As a result, States and oth-
er global actors could plausibly invoke or apply any of these positions in 
the Syria case.  
 
A. An Absolute Prohibition 
 
The most restrictive position in the literature would permit defensive force 
only if the initial attack were attributable to a State—and thus would pro-
hibit such force against non-State actors. Conceptually, those who advance 
this position posit that operating in another State without its consent is the 
same as operating against that other State; the State has a right to its own 
territorial integrity. So, the reasoning goes, permitting defensive force in 
that State would mean holding it accountable for acts that are not its own. 
Instead of using defensive force, the victim State may lawfully address the 
problem by: (1) asking the territorial State to prevent the violence, (2) ob-
taining the territorial State’s consent to use force, or (3) seeking relief from 
the UN Security Council.  
An absolute prohibition of the use of defensive force against non-State 
actors finds solid support in the jurisprudence of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ). Two post-9/11 cases are directly on point. In the 2004 advi-
sory opinion in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 












of an armed attack by one State against another State.”
10
 The Court then de-
termined that Article 51 did not excuse Israel’s security barrier on the Pal-
estinian territories, in part because Israel did not claim that it had been vic-
timized by another State.
11
 A similar logic appears in the 2005 Armed Activi-
ties case between Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC). The Court found that “there [was] no satisfactory proof of the in-
volvement in these attacks, direct or indirect, of the Government of the 
DRC.”
12
 In other words, any attack was “non-attributable to the DRC.”
13
 
The Court then determined that “the legal and factual circumstances for 




Some have suggested that the Armed Activities judgment does not sup-
port an absolute prohibition of defensive force against non-State actors.
15
 
Indeed, the judgment avoids the issue of whether defensive force is ever 
lawful in response to “large-scale attacks by irregular forces.”
16
 This lan-
guage arguably preserves the possibility that States may use defensive force 
against irregular groups whose conduct is not attributable to a State—in 
other words, that such force can be lawful, even if a group does not act on 
behalf of a State, as a State agent. However, the better interpretation is that 
the Court meant to leave open the question of whether States may use de-
fensive force against irregular groups that are State agents. This latter inter-
pretation would make Armed Activities both internally consistent and con-
sistent with the Court’s earlier judgment in Military and Paramilitary Activities 
                                                                                                                      
10. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 139 (July 9) (emphasis added). See also Sean 
D. Murphy, Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse Dixit from the ICJ?, 99 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF  INTERNATIONAL LAW 62 (2005); but cf. CHRISTINE GRAY, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 136 (3d ed. 2008) (arguing that this language 
can be interpreted narrowly, to permit defensive force against non-State actors in other 
States). 
11. Wall, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 139. 
12. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 
2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶ 146 (Dec. 19). 
13. Id. 
14. Id., ¶ 147. 
15. Id., separate opinion of Simma, J., ¶ 7 (claiming that the judgment is ambiguous); 
Christian J. Tams, The Use of Force Against Terrorists, 20 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF  INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 359, 384 (2009) (describing the judgment as “far more equivocal” than the 
Wall opinion). 
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in and against Nicaragua.
17
 The Nicaragua Court recognized that “‘the sending 
by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries’” 
might trigger Article 51.
18
 Given the Nicaragua and Wall precedents, and 
the logic of the Armed Activities judgment itself, the case strongly suggests 
that Uganda could not lawfully use defensive force in the DRC because the 
initial attacks were not attributable to the DRC.
19
 
As I explain below, many international lawyers disagree with the ICJ’s 
position or argue that this position has been superseded by events. But in 
the jus ad bellum,
20
 as in other areas of international law,
21
 ICJ decisions are 
treated as highly authoritative and given considerable deference. Thus, oth-
er international lawyers continue to cite the ICJ’s decisions to support an 
absolute prohibition.
22
 For example, Dire Tladi argued in 2013 that, 
“[g]iven the very clear line of reasoning by the [ICJ],” any contrary position 
“must be properly probed.”
23
 Tladi concluded that “[t]he use of force by a 
state against nonstate actors for acts not attributable at all to another state 
                                                                                                                      
17. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. 14 (June 27). 
18. Id., ¶ 195 (emphasis added). 
19. See Albrecht Randelzhofer & Oliver Dörr, Article 2(4), in THE CHARTER OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS 200, 213 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012) [hereinafter CHARTER 
COMMENTARY] (“In its recent jurisprudence the ICJ made it clear that acts of violence by 
non-State actors can only become relevant as amounting to an armed attack, if they are 
attributable to a State . . . .”). 
20. See, e.g., TOM RUYS, “ARMED ATTACK” AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER 52 
(2010) (“It stands beyond doubt that the case law of the ICJ dealing with the law on the 
use of force . . . carries considerable authority.”); Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Choice of Law 
Against Terrorism, 4 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY 343, 359 (2010) 
(“[T]he ICJ and other international tribunals have clarified the general principles and the 
rules of state responsibility applicable to lawful uses of force.”). 
21. See, e.g., Christian J. Tams, The ICJ as a “Law-Formative Agency’: Summary and Synthe-
sis, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE 377, 379 (Christian J. Tams & James Sloan eds., 2013) (“ICJ decisions are accord-
ed ‘a truly astonishing deference in international law.’”). 
22. See, e.g., RUYS, supra note 20, at 486–89; Constantine Antonopoulos, Force by Armed 
Groups as Armed Attack and the Broadening of Self-Defence, 55 NETHERLANDS INTERNATIONAL 
LAW REVIEW 159, 169–71 (2008); cf. Albrecht Randelzhofer & Georg Nolte, Article 51, in 
CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 19, at 1397, 1417 (“[T]he preferable view still seems 
to be that attacks by organized armed groups need to be attributed to a State in order to 
enable the effected State to exercise its right of self-defence, albeit under special [looser 
than normal] rules of attribution.”). 
23. Dire Tladi, The Nonconsenting Innocent State: The Problem with Bethlehem’s Principle, 107 












falls to be considered under the paradigm of law enforcement (in which 
consent of the territorial state would be required) and not the law of self-
defense.”
24
 Mary Ellen O’Connell argued the same: “[a]ttacking [non-State 
actors] on the territory of another state is attacking that state.”
25
  
In addition, the absolute prohibition has had some traction in institu-
tions other than the ICJ. Most notably, Latin American States collectively 
seemed to endorse this prohibition in response to Colombia’s 2008 incur-
sion against non-State actors in Ecuador. A commission of the Organiza-
tion of American States (OAS) labeled the incursion “a violation of the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ecuador and of principles of interna-
tional law.”
26 
The OAS Permanent Council then reaffirmed the “principle 
that the territory of a State is inviolable and may not be the object, even 
temporarily, of . . . measures of force taken by another State, directly or 
indirectly, on any grounds whatsoever.”
27
 The Rio Group of Latin Ameri-




B. Grounds for Defensive Action 
 
Although the absolute prohibition is still in play, it is no longer the domi-
nant position in the literature. Many international lawyers now cite the con-
trary practice as evidence that defensive force against non-State actors is at 
least sometimes lawful.
29
 Conceptually, these lawyers balance the compet-
                                                                                                                      
24. Id. at 576. 
25. Mary Ellen O’Connell, Dangerous Departures, 107 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 380, 380, 383 (2013). 
26. Organization of American States [OAS] Commission, Report of the OAS Commission 
that Visited Ecuador and Colombia 10, OEA/Ser.F/II.25 RC.25/doc. 7/08 (Mar. 16, 2008). 
27. Res. CP/RES/930, ¶ 1 (Mar. 5, 2008), reprinted in id., Annex 1 [hereinafter OAS 
Commission].  
28. OAS Commission, supra note 26, Annex 2 (reprinting Rio Group Declaration), at 
1. Claus Kre argues that this episode “need not . . . be interpreted as the rejection of the 
possibility of a non-state armed attack. . . . It might simply suggest that the non-state vio-
lence . . . was not significant enough to pass the threshold of a non-state armed attack.” 
Claus Kre, Major Post-Westphalian Shifts and Some Important Neo-Westphalian Hesitations in the 
State Practice on the International Law on the Use of Force, 1 JOURNAL ON THE USE OF FORCE 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 11, 45 (2014). That interpretation is plausible but minimizes 
the language in the relevant texts. The texts suggest an absolute prohibition and do not 
address the idea of an armed-attack threshold. I discuss the armed-attack threshold at infra 
notes 65–72 and accompanying text. 
29. See, e.g., Theresa Reinold, State Weakness, Irregular Warfare, and the Right to Self-Defense 
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ing sovereignty interests of the territorial State and the victim State. As for 
how to strike that balance—and when to permit defensive force—the liter-
ature is conflicted. Essentially three grounds for permitting such force are 
plausibly available: (1) the territorial State actively harbors or supports the 
non-State actors, or lacks governance authority in the area from which they 
operate, (2) the territorial State is unable or unwilling to address the threat 
that the non-State actors pose, and (3) the threat is located in the territorial 
State. To be clear, each of these grounds for permitting defensive force has 
some interpretive space and overlaps with the others. The three are best 
conceived as concentric circles; as one moves from the first ground to the 
third, the scope of permissible defensive actions expands. Treating the 
three as distinct is analytically useful, then, because it exposes the variations 
in the practice as the application of Article 51 broadens. As I explain in the 
next Section, any of these grounds for permitting defensive force might be 
further restricted by other conditions that attach to Article 51. 
 
1. An Attack from an Ungoverned Space or from a Harboring or Sup-
porting State 
 
The narrowest ground for permitting defensive force would require that 
the territorial State actively harbor or support the non-State actors, or lack 
control over the area in which they operate. The justification for permitting 
defensive force in these circumstances, but not necessarily in others, is that 
the victim State cannot plausibly rely on the territorial State to contain the 
threat. The territorial State is objectively part of the problem. Indeed, States 
on the whole have endorsed the use of defensive force in several cases in-
volving a harboring or supporting State, or an ungoverned space.  
The global reaction to the 9/11 terrorist attacks is the most significant 
example of States applying a harbor or support standard. The UN Security 
Council and OAS Permanent Council both recognized the Article 51 right 
in the context of condemning those attacks.
30
 Moreover, NATO asserted 
that if the attacks were “directed from abroad,” it would treat them as 
                                                                                                                      
that States increasingly accept “that private armed attacks can occur in which no state is 
substantially involved”); Tams, supra note 15, at 360 (“[T]he international community dur-
ing the last two decades has increasingly recognized a right of states to use unilateral force 
against terrorists.”).  
30. S.C. Res. 1368, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); OAS, Convocation 
of the Twenty-Third Meeting of Consultation of Ministers or Foreign Affairs, 












“armed attacks”—the triggering language for Article 51.
31
 These decisions 
reflect the widespread view that the United States could lawfully use defen-
sive force in Afghanistan, which had harbored al Qaeda.
32
 Separately, the 
African Union adopted a harbor or support standard in its 2005 defense 
pact. The pact defines “aggression,” which generally triggers Article 51, to 
include “the encouragement, support, harbouring, or provision of any as-
sistance for the commission of terrorist acts and other violent trans-
national organized crimes against a Member State.”
33
 
The harbor or support standard was also arguably in play in the case of 
Israel’s 2006 operation against Hezbollah—although here, that standard 
bleeds into the ungoverned space standard. At the time of the Israeli opera-
tion, Hezbollah participated in Lebanon’s central government and con-
trolled much of Lebanon’s territory. As Theresa Reinold explains, “Hez-
bollah [had] erected a state within a state and . . . had emancipated itself 
entirely from the central government’s writ.”
34 
Because Hezbollah was well 
represented in Lebanon’s central government, it could influence that gov-
ernment to bolster its own violent policies. The government might be de-
scribed as supporting Hezbollah. Alternatively, the government could be 
said to lack control over the areas in which the militant wing of Hezbollah 
operated.
35
 The Security Council had repeatedly called on the government 
to extend its authority and control to Hezbollah’s strongholds.
36
 In either 
                                                                                                                      
31. Press Release, NATO, Statement by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson 
(Oct. 8, 2001), available at www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-138e.htm. 
32. Some commentators have interpreted the decisions more broadly—not to be lim-
ited to harbor or support scenarios. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, Terrorism and the Right of 
Self-Defense, 95 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 839, 840 (2001); Christo-
pher Greenwood, International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and 
Iraq, 4 SAN DIEGO INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 7, 17 (2003). That interpretation is 
plausible, but it extends the decisions beyond their immediate texts and contexts. 
33. African Union, African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact art. 
1(c)(xi), Jan. 31, 2005, available at http://www.african-court.org/en/images/documents 
/Other_Relevant_Instruments/AU%20Non%20Agression%20and%20Common%20Def
ence%20Pact.pdf.  
34. Reinold, supra note 29, at 266. 
35. Id. at 263; Andreas Zimmerman, The Second Lebanon War: Jus ad Bellum, Jus in 
Bello, and the Issue of Proportionality, 11 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS 
LAW 99, 115 (2007). 
36. See, e.g., S.C. Res., 1655, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1655 (Jan. 31, 2006); S.C. Res. 1614, 
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event, many third States responded to Israel’s 2006 operation by expressly 
recognizing Israel’s right to use defensive force against Hezbollah.
37
  
Other support for the ungoverned space standard is more scattered. In 
Armed Activities, Judges Kooijmans and Simma wrote separate opinions that 
endorsed this standard. Kooijmans and Simma bemoaned “the almost 
complete absence of governmental authority in the whole or part of the 
territory of certain States.”
38
 The two judges then asserted that, “if armed 
attacks are carried out by irregular forces from such territory against a 
neighboring State, these activities are still armed attacks even if they cannot 
be attributed to the territorial State.”
39
 The Institut de Droit Internacional 
took a similar position in 2007. The Institut recognized that States may “in 
principle” use defensive force against non-State actors; it then identified 
only one scenario in which such force would be lawful: if the attack “is 
launched from an area beyond the jurisdiction of any state.”
40
  
Finally, several incidents involving the territorial State’s ambiguous or 
imperfect consent are probably better described as defensive operations in 
ungoverned spaces. Consider three examples. First, the United States has 
repeatedly struck non-State militants in Pakistan. The extent to which the 
Pakistani government has consented to these strikes is unclear. Pakistan 
has publicly condemned some U.S. strikes, but reports indicate that it has 
also, covertly, consented to these strikes.
41
 In any event, the U.S. strikes 
occur primarily in areas that are beyond the Pakistani government’s juris-
                                                                                                                      
37. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5489th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.5489 (July 14, 
2006); U.N. SCOR, 61st Sess., 5488th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.5488 (July 13, 2006). 
38. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 
2005 I.C.J. 168, separate opinion of Simma, J., ¶ 12 (Dec. 19). See also id., separate opinion 
of Kooijmans, J. ¶ 30 (using almost identical language). 
39. Id., separate opinion of Simma, J., ¶ 12. See also id., separate opinion of Kooijmans, 
J., ¶ 30 (using almost identical language). 
40. Institut de Droit International, Present Problems of the Use of Armed Force in 
International Law, Resolution 10A, ¶ 10(ii) (Oct. 27, 2007), available at http://www.idi-
iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2007_san_02_en.pdf. 
41. See, e.g., Greg Miller & Bob Woodward, Secret Memos Reveal Explicit Nature of U.S., 
Pakistan Agreement on Drones, WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.washington 
post.com/world/national-security/top-pakistani-leaders-secretly-backed-cia-drone-campai 
gn-secret-documents-show/2013/10/23/15e6b0d8-3beb-11e3-b6a9-da62c264f40e_story. 
html; Bill Roggio, US Launches Drone Strike in North Waziristan, LONG WAR JOURNAL (Nov. 















 Although the strikes have been criticized on human 
dignity grounds, most third States have remained quiet about the potential 
intrusions on Pakistani sovereignty.
43
 Second, most States were muted or 
mildly supportive when Ethiopia invaded Somalia in 2006.
44
 The stated 
purpose of the invasion was to defend against the threat posed by Islamist 
groups that controlled considerable portions of Somali territory.
45
 Ethiopia 
also hinted that the transitional Somali government had invited the incur-
sion, but invitations to intervene that are issued by only one side to an in-
ternal conflict—especially by a side that lacks control over much of the ter-
ritory—are commonly viewed as suspect.
46
 Third, France reportedly justi-
fied its 2013 operation against al Qaeda-affiliated militants in Mali “on the 
grounds of maintaining stability in the region and reducing the risk of ter-
                                                                                                                      
42. See Sean D. Murphy, The International Legality of U.S. Military Cross-Border Operations 
from Afghanistan into Pakistan, in THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 109, 114 
(Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2009) (Vol. 85, U.S. Naval War College International Law Stud-
ies); Saeed Shah, Pakistan Operation Targets Waziristan Militants, WALL STREET JOURNAL 
(June 15, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/pakistan-operation-targets-waziristan-
militants-1402844572. 
43. See Reinold, supra note 29, at 280 (reviewing incidents and concluding that “the 
strikes in Pakistan did not trigger much of an international response”); see generally Philip 
Alston, The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders, 2 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY 
JOURNAL 283, 434 (2011) (noting “the silence of other countries” about U.S. drone 
strikes). 
44. GRAY, supra note 10, at 244 (describing a “reluctance of other states to enter into 
legal debate” on the action and explaining that “[t]he public silence of China, Russia and 
the NAM was striking”); Zeray W. Yihdego, Ethiopia’s Military Action Against the Union of 
Islamic Courts and Others in Somalia: Some Legal Implications, 56 INTERNATIONAL LAW & 
COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 666, 673 (2007) (“The prevalent view of the internation-
al community does seem impliedly to approve the Ethiopian action . . . .”). 
45. Jonathan Clayton, Ethiopia Confronts Somali Warlords, TIMES (London), Nov. 24, 
2006, at 53 (quoting the Ethiopian Prime Minister as asserting that his country had to de-
fend itself against the threat posed by Islamists in Somalia); Monitoring Group on Soma-
lia, Report, transmitted by letter dated Nov. 22, 2006 from the Chairman of the Security 
Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, ¶¶ 200–11, U.N. Doc. S/2006/913 
(Nov. 22, 2006) (documenting that the transitional Somali government lacked control over 
large portions of Somali territory). 
46. See GRAY, supra note 10, at 81; Louise Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of Military 
Intervention by Invitation of the Government, 56 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
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rorist attacks elsewhere, including France.”
47
 France also claimed to have 
the consent of the transitional Malian government, but here again, any con-
sent by a domestic authority was imperfect: rebel groups already controlled 
much Malian territory.
48
 The global reaction to France’s operation was pos-
itive. Several States affirmatively supported France,
49
 and a few months 





2. An Attack from an Unable or Unwilling State 
 
A territorial State that actively harbors or supports the relevant non-State 
actors, or lacks control over the area from which they operate, is demon-
strably unable or unwilling to contain the threat. Such situations would also 
be covered by an unable or unwilling standard. But the unable or unwilling 
standard is broader. It would permit defensive force against non-State ac-
                                                                                                                      
47. Afua Hirsch & Kim Willsher, Mali Conflict: France Has Opened Gates of Hell, Says Re-
bels, GUARDIAN (London) (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan 
/14/mali-conflict-france-gates-hell. 
48. See John R. Crook, Contemporary Practice of the United States: United States Provides Mili-
tary Support to French Operations against Militants in Mali, 107 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF  IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 466, 466–67 (2013); France Confirms Mali Military Intervention, BBC 
NEWS (Jan. 11, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-20991719.  
49. See Crook, supra note 48; Hirsch & Willsher, supra note 47; France Confirms Mali 
Military Intervention, supra note 48; Adam Nossiter & Neil MacFarquhar, On the Ground in 
Mali, French and Local Troops Confront Islamist Forces, NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 17, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/17/world/africa/france-mali-intervention.html?_r=0. 
50. S.C. Res. 2100, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2100 (Apr. 25, 2013). Some readers might 
question my characterization of this operation as defensive, rather than consent-based or 
Council-authorized. When the Council endorsed France’s action, it described France as 
having acted with the consent of the transitional Malian government. As I explain in the 
text, this consent was imperfect. Indeed, the Council itself seemed to recognize as much 
when, in December 2012, it authorized an African-led mission to support the transitional 
government. S.C. Res. 2085, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2085 (Dec. 20, 2012). The Council’s au-
thorizing resolution invoked Chapter VII, even though the transitional government had 
requested the mission. The Council need not use Chapter VII when it acts with the terri-
torial State’s consent. Moreover, although the December 2012 resolution authorized an 
African-led mission, it did not authorize a French one. Subsequent Council resolutions 
corrected that deficiency by specifically authorizing French troops to intervene in Mali. 
S.C. Res. 2100, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2100 (Apr. 25, 2013); S.C. Res. 2164, ¶ 26, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/2164 (June 25, 2014). My point in the text is that the alternative justifications 
for France’s intervention are insufficient. The intervention is most accurately described as 












tors even when the territorial State exercises governance authority and ac-
tively tries to suppress the violence—but is, simply, ineffective. The stand-
ard is controversial because it risks tipping the balance too far in favor of 
the victim State, without sufficient regard for the interests of the territorial 
State or the broader prospects for peace and security. Nevertheless, a 
number of States—including the United States, Israel, Russia and Turkey—
have expressly invoked the standard to justify defensive operations.
51 
The 
standard also finds support in some of the secondary literature.
52 
 
States have, in effect, applied the unable or unwilling standard in con-
crete cases. For example, Turkey’s 2008 ground incursion into Iraq to inca-
pacitate Kurdish rebels does not fit neatly within the harbor or support, or 
the ungoverned space standard. Iraq’s Kurdish region had considerable 
autonomy from the central government but was not in any meaningful 
sense ungoverned.
53
 Moreover, although some Iraqi officials were probably 
sympathetic to the rebels, the evidence that these officials actively harbored 
or supported the rebels is weak. Iraqi officials in the Kurdish region had 
dissociated themselves from the rebels,
54
 and the central Iraqi government 
was working with Turkey to address the violence.
55
 The government was, 
however, unable to prevent the violence.
56
 The incident sounds in the una-
ble or unwilling standard. And the global reaction was notably muted.
57
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52. See, e.g., Chatham House Principles, supra note 5, at 969; LEIDEN POLICY RECOM-
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NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 26, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/26/world 
/europe/26turkey.html. 
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334, 338, 342, 353 (2008). See also Turkey Invades Northern Iraq, ECONOMIST (Feb. 28, 2008), 
http://www.economist.com/node/10766808 (“Iraq’s Kurds have little love for the PKK, 
and insist that they do not help it with logistics or weapons.”). 
55. Reinold, supra note 29, at 272; Ruys, supra note 54, at 342. 
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Most third States tolerated the operation without endorsing or rejecting 
Turkey’s Article 51 claim.
58 
 
Similarly, most States effectively applied the unable or unwilling stand-
ard to Russia’s 2002 and 2007 incursions against Chechen rebels in Geor-
gia. Although Georgia was actively taking measures to suppress the rebels’ 
violence, these measures were not yet effective.
59
 When Russia responded 
with force, the vast majority of third States stayed quiet.
60
 The most nota-
ble exception was the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly, which 
declared in 2002 that “Article 51 . . . do[es] not authorise the use of military 
force by the Russian Federation or any other state on Georgian territory.”
61
 
The Turkey-Iraq and Russia-Georgia cases show that the unable or 
unwilling standard is sometimes implemented in practice. In each of these 
cases, the acting State specifically invoked the unable or unwilling standard 
as law. Third States, for the most part, did not endorse the legal claim, but 
they tacitly condoned the actual operations. They stood by as the unable or 
unwilling standard was applied. This reaction differs from the reaction to at 
least some operations involving a harboring or supporting State, or an un-
governed space. Recall that third States affirmatively endorsed the U.S.-
Afghanistan, Israel-Lebanon and France-Mali operations. The difference 
suggests that many States might tolerate operations under an unable or 
unwilling standard without actively supporting these operations or legiti-
mizing them with legal language.  
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measures to address the terrorism problem, and that these measures “are entering a deci-
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3. An Attack that is Sourced to Another State 
 
Taken to its extreme, the unable or unwilling standard might permit defen-
sive force once an attack has emanated from the territorial State. The mere 
fact of the attack might be said to show that the territorial State is unable 
or unwilling to suppress the violence. After all, the State actually failed to 
prevent an attack. Yet no State has expressly advanced such an expansive 
interpretation of the unable or unwilling standard. The standard is generally 
thought to turn on the territorial State’s actual conduct and capabilities. 
Still, States sometimes use defensive force without making a claim or show-
ing about the territorial State. These operations suggest a standard that is 
even broader: that defensive force is permissible if the source of the attack 
is located in another State.  
Consider Israel’s reported attacks on weapons caches in Sudan and Syr-
ia; the weapons allegedly were headed to Hamas or Hezbollah.
62
 The oper-
ations targeting these weapons reflect expansive applications of Article 51 
for three reasons. First, the operations were intended not to prevent an 
immediately imminent attack but rather to nip in the bud a latent threat. 
The dominant view in the literature is that anticipatory self-defense is law-
ful only if the attack is actually imminent.
63
 Second, Sudan and Syria were, 
at best, indirect sources of an attack. The weapons almost certainly would 
have been used from Gaza or Lebanon. Third, as Israel has not publicly 
acknowledged its role in these operations, it has not even tried to show that 
the relevant territorial States were unable or unwilling to prevent the at-
tacks. Such a claim is plausible but not a slam dunk, especially as it con-
cerns Hamas. Because Israel itself controls Gaza’s borders, it might have 
had other reasonable opportunities to prevent Hamas from receiving or 
                                                                                                                      
62. See, e.g., Karl Vick & Aaron J. Klein, Israel Bombs Hizballah Missile Convoy on Syria-
Lebanon Border, TIME (Feb. 24, 2014), http://world.time.com/2014/02/25/israel-bombs-
hizballah-missile-convoy-on-syria-lebanon-border/; Isabel Kershner, Official Silence in Israel 
Over Sudan’s Accusations of Air Attack, NEW YORK TIMES (Oct. 25, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/26/world/africa/official-silence-in-israel-over-sud 
ans-accusations-of-air-attack.html?_r=1&; Michael R. Gordon & Jeffrey Gettleman, U.S. 
Officials Say Israel Struck in Sudan, NEW YORK TIMES, Mar. 27, 2009, at A7. See also Niger: 
French Strike a Qaeda Convoy, NEW YORK TIMES (Oct. 10, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/11/world/africa/niger-french-strike-a-qaeda-
convoy.html (reporting on French attack against a weapons convoy in Niger that was 
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using the weapons. Yet despite the expansive nature of these operations, 
the global reaction has been largely silent. A few States have verbally con-
demned some of the operations, but most States have looked the other 
way.
64
 These incidents show that the majority of States silently tolerates 
even operations that reflect very expansive interpretations of Article 51. 
   
C. Enhanced Limitations 
 
Any of the above grounds for permitting defensive force against non-State 
actors might be further limited by other requirements that attach to Article 
51. Two possibilities appear in the secondary literature. One is to permit 
defensive force only if the initial attack is especially severe. The second is 
to permit such force only after the territorial State is given a meaningful 
opportunity to cooperate with the operation. Each of these limitations has 
some seeds in the practice, but the support for it is equivocal.    
First, the ICJ has long taken the view that, although Article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter prohibits even low levels of force, such force does not neces-
sarily trigger Article 51. According to the Court, defensive force is permis-
sible only if the initial incursion is sufficiently severe to qualify as an 
“armed attack.”
65
 In practice, any severity threshold for an armed attack 
appears to be marginal. States sometimes use defensive force, without re-
percussion, in response to very low levels of force.
66
 Some experts argue, 
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armed attack . . . .”); Christopher Greenwood, The International Court of Justice and the Use of 
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however, that no matter how the threshold applies in State-to-State con-
flicts, it should be taken seriously and even heightened in cases involving 
non-State actors.
67 
For example, the Chatham House Principles and Leiden Poli-
cy Recommendations both endorse the unable or unwilling standard but posit 
that the initial attack must be especially severe to trigger that standard.
68
 In 
2013, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions cited those 
reports to assert that “[t]here is an emerging view that the level of violence 
necessary to justify a resort to self-defence ought to be set higher when it is 




A heightened armed-attack threshold lacks precision but would proba-
bly prohibit defensive force unless the victim State is hit severely or repeat-
edly. (Under the so-called “pinprick” or “accumulation of events” theory 
of an armed attack, multiple small-scale attacks could together satisfy the 
threshold, even if none of the attacks on its own could satisfy the thresh-
old. This theory has gained considerable legal traction over the past two 
decades.
70
) The advantage of a heightened threshold is that it would give 
the territorial State some room to deal with its internal problem before be-
ing subjected to defensive force. However, States have not themselves ad-
vocated for lifting the threshold in cases involving non-State actors. More-
over, although defending States sometimes wait for a hard hit before re-
sponding with defensive force,
71 
they do not always.
72
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89, U.N. Doc. A/68/382 (Sept. 13, 2013) (by Christof Heyns) [hereinafter Heyns]. 
70. See, e.g., GRAY, supra note 10, at 130, 155; Tams, supra note 15, at 388 (“[S]tates 
seem to have shown a new willingness to accept the ‘accumulation of events’ doctrine 
which previously had received little support.”); Steenberghe, supra note 58, at 184 (“[A]ny 
armed attack must reach some level of gravity—which may be evaluated by accumulating 
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The second possible limitation lies in the necessity requirement. This 
requirement attaches to Article 51 as a matter of customary international 
law and generally demands that defensive force be the option of last resort; 
the victim State must exhaust the feasible alternatives for addressing a 
problem before resorting to defensive force.
73
 Some experts have argued 
that defensive force is unnecessary if the territorial State would meaningful-
ly cooperate to suppress the violence, whether by using its law enforcement 
tools or by consenting to a forcible operation.
74
 This interpretation would 
essentially impose on the victim State the burden of trying to work with the 
territorial State before using defensive force.  
The support for that interpretation is equivocal. Victim States com-
monly do try to work with territorial States before resorting to defensive 
force.
75
 But even when a victim State makes this effort, the territorial 
State’s consent might be attenuated, and its participation in any operation 
to deal with the problem might be limited. The U.S.-Pakistan, Ethiopia-
Somalia, and France-Mali operations are illustrative. Moreover, in practice, 
the burden to cooperate to address the violence seems to fall not on the 
victim State but on the territorial State.76 Claims to use defensive force 
against non-State actors typically focus on the territorial State’s own fail-
ings, not on the victim State’s efforts to address the problem through less 
intrusive means.
77
 And third States rarely push back on this point. To be 
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clear, a victim State that does not try to work with the territorial State might 
weaken its claim under one of the other standards—especially, the unable 
or unwilling standard.
78
 A territorial State that had been unable to suppress 
the violence on its own might be more effective if it works with the victim. 
A territorial State that had been unwilling to suppress the violence might be 
more invested once it realizes that the alternative is defensive force.
79
 Still, 
the unable or unwilling standard puts on the territorial State the burden to 
cooperate or otherwise address the problem. 
 
D. The State of Play before the Syria Operation 
 
When the Syria operations began, then, States and other relevant actors had 
not yet coalesced around a legal standard to regulate the use of defensive 
force against non-State actors. Of the plausibly available legal standards, 
the most restrictive one—the absolute prohibition—was still occasionally 
invoked but increasingly out of touch with the operational practice. Over 
the past fifteen years, States have regularly conducted and tolerated defen-
sive actions against non-State actors in other States. Some of these actions, 
like the Israeli ones in Sudan and Syria, reflect extremely expansive applica-
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tions of Article 51. But using or tolerating defensive force is not quite the 
same as endorsing or advocating for its legality. The norms that are opera-
tional in practice are looser than the ones that are widely invoked and artic-
ulated as law. The majority of States has affirmatively supported defensive 
operations and validated Article 51 claims in only a handful of cases involv-
ing non-State actors.  
The discrepancy between what States tolerate in practice and what they 
endorse as law might be explained by any number of factors. Because ICJ 
pronouncements are generally treated as authoritative, some States might 
hesitate to accept or advance alternative interpretations that are still con-
troversial. Other States might favor a restrictive legal position in principle 
but find that position too constraining in concrete cases. Still other States 
might lack the incentive to defend or promote a particular legal position. 
Or they might be conflicted on how to balance the competing interests at 
stake. The point here is that, when the Syria operations began, the field was 
still fairly open. Multiple positions were in play, so actors seeking to push 
the law in a particular direction could plausibly invoke or apply any one of 
them. I turn, then, to the question of how States have engaged with the law 
in the Syria case.  
 
III. THE SYRIA OPERATIONS 
 
Two defensive operations are occurring simultaneously in Syria: one against 
the Islamic State and the other against the Khorasan group. The Islamic 
State emerged in Syria in 2013, in the midst of the ongoing civil war.
80
 In 
January 2014, the Islamic State crossed into Iraq and seized the Iraqi cities 
of Fallujah and Ramadi.
81
 By June, the Islamic State had swept across 
northern Iraq and captured Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city.
82
 In August, 
the United States began airstrikes against the Islamic State in Iraq, at the 
Iraqi government’s request.
83
 Yet even as the United States acted in Iraq, 
the Islamic State was seizing more territory in Syria. By some accounts, the 
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group controlled about 35 percent of Syria’s territory.
84
 In September, a 
U.S.-led coalition began striking the Islamic State in Syria. At the same 
time, the United States began hitting the Khorasan group in Syria. U.S. of-
ficials describe this group as a small but extremely dangerous unit of “sea-
soned al Qaeda veterans” who are plotting attacks against the United States 
and other Western targets.
85
 
The operations in Syria have accentuated three preexisting trends on 
the use of defensive force against non-State actors. First, the claim that in-
ternational law absolutely prohibits such force is losing ground. The reac-
tion to the operation against the Islamic State in Syria has been positive. 
Second, States are still floundering on when to permit such force. Many 
States seem unsure about the correct legal standard or uncommitted to ad-
vancing a particular legal standard. Third, there is still a significant gap be-
tween the norms that are actually implemented and the ones that are legit-
imized as law. Most States tolerate operations that they are not yet willing 
to validate with legal language. 
 
A. Supporting Some Defensive Force against Non-State Actors 
 
The global reaction to the defensive operation against the Islamic State has 
been positive. According to the United States, more than forty countries 
have helped fight the Islamic State in Iraq or Syria.
86
 The nature of this 
participation varies. Five Arab countries are themselves using force in Syria: 
Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.
87
 
Other States—Australia, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Canada, Denmark, 
France, and the Netherlands—are attacking the Islamic State in Iraq but 
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 Still other States are providing military or logistical support 
for the general campaign against the Islamic State.
89
 All of these countries 
presumably support the operation against the Islamic State in Syria; the 
Syria strikes are an integral part of the broader mission to suppress the Is-
lamic State.  
In fact, several States that are not themselves using force in Syria have 
expressly endorsed that part of the campaign. Shortly before the coalition 
began hitting targets in Syria, ten Arab countries issued a joint statement to 
support the military operation. The signatory States said that they had “dis-
cussed a strategy to destroy [the Islamic State] wherever it is, including in 
both Iraq and Syria,” and that they would “do their share in the compre-
hensive fight against [the Islamic State],” including, “as appropriate, joining 
in the many aspects of a coordinated military campaign.”
90
 Separately, Tur-
key announced that it might provide military or logistical support for the 
operation.
91
 And the United Kingdom made clear that it “support[ed] the 
latest airstrikes against [Islamic State] terrorists which have been carried out 
by the U.S. and five other countries.”
92
 Significantly, a few States have also 
suggested that attacking the Islamic State in Syria is internationally lawful.
93
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Even UN officials appear to have condoned the operation. In August 
2014, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2170, which did not author-
ize force but called on States to take various measures to suppress the Is-
lamic State.
94
 On October 10, the UN Special Envoy for Syria described 
the U.S.-led coalition as having “been created on the basis of resolution 
2170,” and then asked countries to do “what [they] can in order to control 
and hopefully stop this atrocious terrorist movement.”
95
 To be sure, the 
Special Envoy also said that any action against the Islamic State in Syria 
should respect “the broad parameters of international law and integrity and 
sovereignty of Syria,” but that language is noncommittal, and the Special 
Envoy was almost apologetic about using it: “the UN cannot say other-
wise.”
96 
He clearly was not trying to condemn the operation. Neither was 
the UN Secretary-General when he said, on September 23, that it was “un-
deniable—and the subject of broad international consensus—that these 




In addition, some States that might be expected to condemn the opera-
tion have not done so. For example, China has sided with Russia in resist-
ing a number of U.S.-led military operations. But in this case, China’s posi-
                                                                                                                      
Strikes in Syria, REUTERS (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/22/ 
us-france-fabius-airstrikes-idUSKCN0HH28920140922 (quoting French Foreign Minister 
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Strikes on Islamic State in Syria, REUTERS (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
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by [the Islamic State] from Syria”); cf. Interview by Fran Kelly with Australian Prime Min-
ister Tony Abbott, ABC RADIO NATIONAL (Aus.) (Sept. 16, 2014), https://www.pm.gov. 
au/media/2014-09-16/interview-fran-kelly-abc-radio-national (noting that Australia had 
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95. U.N. Special Envoy for Syria Staffen de Mistura, Remarks at Press Conference in 
Geneva, Switzerland (Oct. 10, 2014), transcript available at http://www.un.org/sg/off thec-
uff/index.asp?nid=3674. 
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tion was ambivalent or even mildly supportive.
98
 The day after the Syria 
strikes began, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry explained 
that “China always supports the counter-terrorism efforts made by the in-
ternational community.”
99
 The spokesperson then hinted at China’s linger-
ing discomfort: “international law, the sovereignty, independence and terri-
torial integrity of relevant countries should be respected.”
100
 India, which 
has resisted other international interventions,
101
 has been noticeably quiet 
about the Syria strikes. Indeed, even the Assad regime in Syria has commu-
nicated a mixed message. Before the operation began, the regime said that 
“[a]ny action of any kind without the consent of the Syrian government 
would be an attack on Syria.”
102
 Yet once the operation was under way, the 
regime moderated its tone, noting that it supports “any international effort 
that contributes to the fight against terrorists.”
103
 In the end, the regime 
has not resisted the defensive operation; it has instead suggested that it and 
the U.S.-led coalition are fighting the same enemy.
104
  
Still, some States have objected to the operation. The most vocal objec-
tions have come from Russia and Iran—two States with longstanding ties 
to the current Syrian regime and a direct stake in the outcome of the Syrian 
civil war. Both States condemned the operation and hinted toward an abso-
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lute prohibition of defensive force against non-State actors.
105
 However, 
that position appears to reflect the particular interests in this case, not a 
principled stance on the law. Russia and Iran have both claimed the right to 
use defensive force against non-State actors in other contexts.
106
 A handful 
of other States have been more mildly negative. For example, Argentine 
President Cristina Fernandez de Kirschner seemed to criticize the opera-
tion when she asserted that, “if the UN General Assembly is actually al-
lowed to serve its mandate, despite the lack of observance by some nations, 
. . . we could actually have international law and order built on dialogue and 
peace instead of military intervention.”
107
  
Those negative reactions are outliers. The States that support the de-
fensive operation against the Islamic State far outnumber the ones that re-
sist it. This broad and affirmative support suggests that most States have 
moved past any norm that absolutely prohibits the use of defensive force 
against non-State actors. Most States seem to accept—and even endorse—
the idea that such force is sometimes permissible. 
 
B. Floundering on the Applicable Legal Standard 
 
However, States have not coalesced around a legal standard for when such 
force is permissible. Unsurprisingly, the United States invoked the unable 
or unwilling standard to justify the defensive operation against the Islamic 
State in Syria. The U.S. report to the Security Council explained that Iraq 
was “facing a serious threat of continuing attacks from the Islamic State . . . 
coming out of safe havens in Syria,” and that, as “[t]he Syrian regime has 
shown that it cannot and will not confront these safe havens effectively 
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Other States have declined to use unable or unwilling language in this 
case. Most States seem unsure of the correct legal standard or reluctant to 
advance any particular legal standard. For example, although a few States 
have suggested that the operation against the Islamic State is internationally 
lawful, these States have not presented a coherent theory of the case: they 
have not explained precisely why the operation is lawful or under what 
standard the operation should be assessed.
109
 The Deputy Prime Minister 
of the Netherlands specifically noted that, “[f]or military operations in Syr-
ia, there is currently no international agreement on an internationally legal 
mandate.”
110
 And the fact that several States have used force against the 
Islamic State in Iraq but have declined to do so in Syria suggests a certain 
discomfort with the Syria part of the campaign.  
This lack of legal conviction is all the more remarkable because the de-
fensive operation against the Islamic State could be justified on three rela-
tively narrow grounds. First, the operation fits squarely in the ungoverned 
space standard. The airstrikes against the Islamic State are being conducted 
almost exclusively in areas that are beyond the authority or control of any 
recognized government.
111
 A few States have hinted that this factor is le-
gally relevant but have not articulated it as the governing legal standard.
112
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Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon did the same, when he “note[d] that the 




Second, the Assad regime seems to have acquiesced in the operation. 
Of course, acquiescence is not the same as consent.
114 
And the United 
States has gone out of its way to underscore that it did not obtain Assad’s 
consent or otherwise coordinate with his government.
115
 But States have 
previously supported defensive operations in ungoverned spaces, with min-
imal “buy in” from the territorial State. Recall the U.S.-Pakistan, Ethiopia-
Somalia, and France-Mali precedents. As in the U.S.-Pakistan case, the ex-
tent to which a relevant domestic authority has consented to the operation 
in Syria is unclear. As in the Ethiopia-Somalia and France-Mali cases, splin-
tered control over Syria’s territory calls into question the validity of such 
consent.
116
 Still, the United States apparently gave the regime advance no-
tice of the impending operation, and the regime chose not to protest. The 
regime even suggested that this notice somehow mitigated the intrusion.
117
 
China and the UN Secretary-General suggested the same.
118
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Third, the operation against the Islamic State responded to a massive 
armed attack. By the time the coalition began using force in Syria, the Is-
lamic State had already seized several Iraqi cities. Moreover, the Security 
Council had determined that this conduct posed a serious threat not only 
to Iraq but to international peace and security more generally.
119
 Any 
heightened threshold for an armed attack would surely have been satisfied 
in this case.  
These three grounds for limiting the right to use defensive force—the 
ungoverned space standard, the modest buy-in of a domestic authority, and 
a heightened armed-attack threshold—were available to States in the Syria 
case. Each ground had support in the relevant precedents or in high-profile 
documents in the secondary literature. And yet, States that undoubtedly 
supported the operation against the Islamic State declined to invoke these 
grounds to justify the operation under international law or to delimit the 
scope of Article 51 more generally. This behavioral pattern—States’ reluc-
tance to articulate a legal justification even for an operation that they sup-
port—suggests that many States are not yet ready to push the law in a par-
ticular direction. They presumably are conflicted or uncertain about how 
this area of law is or should be developing.  
 
C. Tolerating a Broad Range of Defensive Operations 
 
The reluctance to advance even a narrow legal position on the operation 
against the Islamic State does not reflect a concerted effort to prevent 
much more expansive applications of Article 51. States have generally been 
lax about policing defensive operations against non-State actors. The reac-
tion to the operation against the Khorasan group is indicative. Even the 
United States has been somewhat opaque about the legal justification for 
this operation. The U.S. report to the Security Council noted, almost as an 
aside, that in addition to attacking the Islamic State in Syria, the United 
States would target “al-Qaida elements in Syria known as the Khorasan 
Group to address terrorist threats that they pose to the United States and 
our partners and allies.”
120
 However, the United States has declined to 
elaborate on this Article 51 claim.  
Two justifications for using defensive force against the Khorasan group 
are plausible, but each is contingent on facts that are not publicly available 
and on legal positions that are contested. First, the U.S. strikes might be 
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justified on the ground that the Khorasan group is part of al Qaeda. The 
precise nature of the relationship between those two groups is not publicly 
known. If the groups are meaningfully distinct, al Qaeda’s attacks would 
not trigger the right to use defensive force against the Khorasan group. If 
the groups are intermingled, the extent to which the United States may still 
use defensive force against al Qaeda—especially against al Qaeda outposts 
in States from which al Qaeda has not itself attacked—is unclear. The 
dominant position among international lawyers would probably be that the 
United States may not use defensive force in this context.
121 
 
Alternatively, the strikes against the Khorasan group might be justified 
in anticipatory self-defense. A Pentagon official hinted at this justification 
when he explained that the strikes “were undertaken to disrupt imminent 
attack plotting against the United States and western targets” and that “intel-
ligence reports indicated that the Khorasan Group was in the final stages of 
plans to execute major attacks.”
122
 As discussed, the use of force in antici-
patory self-defense is widely understood to be unlawful, unless an attack is 
truly imminent.
123 
The United States has not publicly addressed how close 
the Khorasan group was to committing an attack. Yet the above-quoted 
language suggests that the group was still planning its attacks and not quite 
ready to strike.124  
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In short, any legal theory to justify the operation against the Khorasan 
group is contingent on facts that are not publicly available and on legal 
claims that are controversial. Yet the global reaction to this operation has 
been remarkably muted. The vast majority of States has neither condemned 
nor supported the operation. Almost all of them have simply looked the 
other way. The gap between the norms that are articulated as law and the 




The law on the use of defensive force against non-State actors is unsettled. 
The Syria operations have not resolved but rather accentuated the ambigui-
ties and inconsistencies in this area. For many international lawyers, the 
instinctive response will be to sift through the practice and try to distill the 
best or most accurate interpretation of the law. This response is not espe-
cially useful so long as States are still struggling over the law’s proper con-
tent. Because States have not coalesced around a legal standard for regulat-
ing such force, each of the legal positions described above is still in play 
and could plausibly be invoked or applied in future cases.  
The claim that international law absolutely prohibits defensive force 
against non-State actors is losing legal traction but not yet dead. After all, 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is widely regarded as a jus cogens norm
125
—
meaning that a practice that chips away at the norm qualifies as law only if 
the practice is as robust and supported as Article 2(4) itself.
126
 Many States 
that have strategic reasons for supporting the operation against the Islamic 
State have not themselves participated in or advanced a legal justification 
for that operation. For some lawyers, this pattern of behavior does not 
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evince a sufficiently robust practice and opinio juris to stray from the ICJ’s 
pronouncements.  
At the other extreme, some lawyers will underscore that the majority of 
States repeatedly conducts or tolerates operations that reflect very expan-
sive applications of Article 51. Although most States have declined to ad-
vance a particular legal standard for regulating defensive force against non-
State actors, most have also refrained from policing such force. In many 
cases, the territorial State has not itself used defensive force or taken other 
measures against the acting State, and third States have remained silent. 
Some lawyers will argue, then, that even operations that push or exceed the 
bounds of the unable or unwilling standard are lawful—in other words, 
that such operations have effectively reshaped the law in their image.
127 
 
In fact, no one position by itself represents the current state of the law. 
With multiple positions in play, each is, simultaneously, legally relevant and 
legally deficient. A position will be legally relevant so long as it continues to 
resonate with enough States or other global actors—such that it might rea-
sonably be invoked or applied in specific incidents. The position will be 
legally deficient so long as it competes with the others for preeminence—
and thus is not widely accepted and treated as law. For now, the position 
that best captures the operational practice seems not to be generally ac-
cepted as law. And whatever position is most widely accepted as an author-
itative statement of law seems not to reflect the operational practice. The 
Syrian case suggests that this struggle within the law will continue for some 
time; most States appear conflicted or uncertain about how this area of law 
is or should be developing.  
Nevertheless, a few basic guidelines can be distilled from the practice: 
the majority of States has affirmatively endorsed defensive operations 
against non-State actors in States that actively harbor or support those ac-
tors, or lack control over the areas from which they operate. Further, most 
States passively tolerate defensive operations in a much broader range of 
circumstances. These latter operations are unlikely to be legitimized or val-
idated as lawful, but they also are unlikely to be condemned or treated as 
unlawful. 
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